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SYMPOSIUM: GLOBAL PERSPEC­
TIVES ON NATIONAL SECURITY
 
FOREWORD: NATIONAL SECURITY’S
 
DISTORTION EFFECTS
 
STEPHEN I. VLADECK* 
In retrospect, we should hardly be surprised that “national se­
curity” concerns have become so pervasive across such a wide and 
diverse range of legal fields over the past decade.  As our social, 
political, and legal cultures have evolved in response to one of the 
most traumatic attacks on the United States in its history, it is only 
natural that the government’s interest in defending the nation— 
and, specifically, in preventing another act of terrorism even ap­
proaching the scale of September 11—has played such a ubiquitous 
role in so many seemingly unrelated legal disciplines. 
To be sure, there are the obvious cases where the national se­
curity implications are inescapable, such as lawsuits arising out of 
the detention of noncitizens at Guantanamo Bay,1 or challenges to 
military commissions,2 or even the civilian criminal prosecutions of 
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.  My 
thanks to Sudha Setty, Sara Fawk, and the editors of the Western New England Law 
Review for inviting me to provide this foreword. 
1. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (holding that the 
Suspension Clause “has full effect” at Guantanamo).  For an excellent recent survey of 
the post-Boumediene litigation, see Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, 
and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445 (2010). 
2. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 653 (2006) (holding that military 
commissions established by President Bush were unlawful because they were inconsis­
tent with the authority that Congress had provided). 
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high-profile terrorism suspects like Zacarias Moussaoui,3 Jose Pa­
dilla,4 Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri,5 Richard Reid,6 and Ahmed 
Omar Abu Ali.7  But even (if not especially) in less obvious cases, 
examples abound of national security concerns precipitating an ex­
pansion or alteration of established precedent: The Second Circuit 
has held that the Supreme Court’s “special needs” doctrine, ordina­
rily invoked to justify mass, suspicionless searches wholly unrelated 
to law enforcement,8 authorizes random searches of anyone travel­
ing on the New York City subway system9—perhaps a surprising 
extension of precedent until one considers its temporal proximity to 
the subway bombings in Madrid and London (not to mention the 
more recent episodes in Moscow).10  The same court has also up­
held the government’s power to detain terrorism suspects as “mate­
rial witnesses” even in investigations in which no one has been 
indicted11 and for a length of time that would probably have been 
far more difficult to defend on September 10, 2001.12 
3. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004). 
4. See, e.g., United States v. Hassoun, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 4180844 (S.D. 
Fla. Nov. 20, 2007) (denying Padilla and his codefendants’ post-trial motion for judg­
ment of acquittal); United States v. Hassoun, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 4180847 (S.D. 
Fla. Nov. 20, 2007) (denying the defendants’ motion for a new trial).  Padilla’s appeal to 
the Eleventh Circuit remains pending as of this writing. 
5. See, e.g., al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.) (vacating the en 
banc Fourth Circuit’s rejection of al-Marri’s challenge to his military detention in light 
of his indictment in civilian criminal court and his transfer to civilian custody), vacating 
al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Mass. 2002). 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).  For more on Abu Ali as a microcosm for the broader debate 
over trying terrorism suspects in the Article III courts, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Terror­
ism Trials and the Article III Courts After Abu Ali, 88 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
8. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-25 (2004); Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 
(2000); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Mich. Dep’t of State 
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 
(1989). 
9. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 269-71, 275 (2d Cir. 2006). 
10. See, e.g., Clifford J. Levy, Female Suicide Bombers Strike at Moscow Subway, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at A1 (describing the March 29 terrorist attacks in Moscow). 
As the Second Circuit noted in MacWade, the New York policy was directly motivated 
by the London attacks. See MacWade, 460 F.3d at 264. 
11. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 56 (2d Cir. 2003). 
12. The Ninth Circuit has recently taken serious issue with the government’s post-
September 11 understanding (and application) of the material-witness statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3144, upholding a damages claim (and denying qualified immunity to former Attor­
ney General Ashcroft) arising out of one particularly egregious case. See al-Kidd v. 
Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 973 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc denied, 598 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 
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The Federal Circuit—yes, even it gets terrorism cases—has 
held that the political-question doctrine bars a takings claim for 
damages arising out of the United States’s 1998 destruction of a 
Sudanese pharmaceutical plant in retaliation for the terrorist at­
tacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.13  In its view, once 
the President determines that a particular facility is “enemy prop­
erty,” there is nothing more for the courts to do.14  The political-
question doctrine has also been invoked by the Eleventh Circuit in 
affirming the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by the wife of a service 
member alleging that her husband’s critical injuries in a traffic acci­
dent in Iraq were caused by the negligence of a military 
contractor.15 
In another round of cases, the Third Circuit concluded that the 
government may categorically close to the public and the press re­
moval proceedings in immigration cases in which the Attorney 
General merely asserts a “special interest” in national security.16  In 
a similar vein, the Fourth Circuit has held that the so-called state-
secrets privilege categorically bars a civil suit by a German citizen 
of Lebanese descent who was subjected to “extraordinary rendi­
tion,”17 even though all parties now concede most of the material 
2010).  I leave for another day the thorny question of whether al-Kidd and Awadallah 
are inconsistent with each other. 
13. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1364-67 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
14. Id. at 1363-65; see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 559 F.3d 
578, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reaching same result in separate suit brought under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 330 F. App’x 200 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
15. See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1281-83 
(11th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2009) (No. 09­
683). But see Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 568 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a suit 
against a contractor by its employees arising out of insurgent attacks in Iraq was not 
necessarily barred by the political-question doctrine).  On March 8, 2010, the Supreme 
Court called for the views of the Solicitor General as to whether the certiorari petition 
in Carmichael should be granted.  Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 78 
U.S.L.W. 3521 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (mem.) (No. 09-683).  As of this writing, the govern­
ment has not yet replied. 
16. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219-20 (3d Cir. 
2002). But see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that the categorical closure of such hearings violated the First Amendment). 
17. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311-13 (4th Cir. 2007).  Similar 
claims brought by others subjected to extraordinary rendition have been dismissed on 
the ground that courts should not infer a Bivens remedy in such cases because of the 
unique national security concerns they raise. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574-77 
(2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2010) 
(No. 09-923).  For a critique of this understanding of Bivens, see Stephen I. Vladeck, 
National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010). 
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facts, including that it was a case of mistaken identity.18  And the 
circuit-level Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review—a 
court that had not published a single opinion in its twenty-three­
year existence as of September 11—has become the first court for­
mally to recognize a “foreign intelligence surveillance” exception to 
the Fourth Amendment,19 a question the Supreme Court expressly 
reserved in the 1970s.20 
There are countless other examples, but I suspect that the 
point has been made: For better or worse, one can find national 
security considerations influencing ordinary judicial decision mak­
ing across almost the entire gamut of contemporary civil and crimi­
nal litigation.  And while one may well question the merits of each 
(and perhaps all) of these decisions, as a body they bespeak a larger 
“distortion effect”—where extant doctrine evolves (or devolves) to 
accommodate national security considerations for which prior case 
law may not adequately have provided.  Indeed, the larger and 
more important question to me seems not to be whether this distor­
tion effect has in fact occurred; the cases cited above, among count­
less others, provide thorough proof of this proposition.  Rather, the 
real query going forward is whether the result has been a body of 
national security-specific doctrine in which exceptional rules are ap­
plied in exceptional cases (and the lines between the exceptional 
and the norm are carefully policed), or whether the exceptions have 
in fact become the rules—whether the stress to recognize excep­
tions in extraordinary cases has led to the normalization of these 
exceptions in all cases.21  As just one example, should we have a 
special “national security court” to handle cases raising unique se­
crecy concerns, or should we find ways to amend the current evi­
18. See, e.g., Ingrid Detter Frankopan, Extraordinary Rendition and the Law of 
War, N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 657, 682 (2008); J. Troy Lavers, Extraordinary Ren­
dition and the Self Defense Justification: Time to Face the Music, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 
385, 407-08 (2007); Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary 
Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1337-38 & n.16 (2007); 
Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege, 
75 BROOK. L. REV. 201, 214-15 (2009). 
19. See In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1010-12 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). 
20. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972). 
21. For a broader suggestion that such a normalization of emergency may be in­
evitable in the modern state, see Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 AM. J. SOC. 
455 (1941). 
289 
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dentiary framework in the civilian courts to accommodate those 
concerns?22 
To be fair, the scholarship that follows in this symposium issue 
of the Western New England Law Review was not specifically ad­
dressed to this question.  And yet, in each of these four distinct and 
thought-provoking pieces, we see at least some signs of the (troub­
ling) answer.  Moreover, as I briefly explain in the short observa­
tions that follow, the authors have each put their fingers not just on 
an important legal question with national security implications but, 
more specifically, on issues that are currently (or likely soon to 
come) before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Aloke Chakravarty’s article is perhaps the best place to start, 
all the more so since he brings to bear his perspective and experi­
ence as a federal prosecutor.23  In that respect, it is telling that his 
focus is not on the criminalization of terrorism but rather on the 
need to promote greater humanitarian efforts in conflict-torn (and 
terrorist-prone) regions as a means of obviating some of the socio­
economic conditions that allow terrorist groups to thrive in the first 
place.  As he explains, “[t]he stabilization and concomitant empow­
erment of governments where terrorist groups thrive is essential to 
promote the rule of law and to compete with the ideological drivers 
that sustain the terrorists.”24  Thus, his article proposes to supple­
ment the already harsh measures in place to block the assets of ter­
rorist groups with an influx of charitable aid into the same regions, 
to fill the economic gap created by the deprivation of terrorist-
backed funds.  Chakravarty thereby reminds us not to think about 
the fight against terrorism purely as a conflict we win on the battle­
field but also as a struggle to ameliorate the poverty and local polit­
ical instability on which terrorist groups capitalize. 
So conceived, Chakravarty’s article presents the precise con­
flict at the heart of the Humanitarian Law Project case currently 
before the Supreme Court, which raises several constitutional chal­
lenges to a 1996 federal statute that prohibits individuals from pro­
viding material support to designated “Foreign Terrorist 
22. See, e.g., GLENN  SULMASY, THE  NATIONAL  SECURITY  COURT  SYSTEM: A 
NATURAL  EVOLUTION OF  JUSTICE IN AN  AGE OF  TERROR (2009).  For a critique of 
these proposals, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 505 (2009). 
23. Aloke Chakravarty, Feeding Humanity, Starving Terror: The Utility of Aid in a 
Comprehensive Antiterrorism Financing Strategy, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 295 (2010). 
24. Id. at 297. 
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Organizations” (FTOs).25  After several rounds of litigation, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the statute is unconstitutionally vague 
to the extent that it prohibits the provision of “service,” “training,” 
or “expert advice or assistance.”26  Specifically, the crux of the 
court of appeals’s analysis was that such prohibitions are vague be­
cause they may also bar constitutionally protected speech in sup­
port of the nonviolent (and specifically peace-building) initiatives of 
the two designated FTOs at issue—the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
and the Tamil Tigers.27  And although nothing would stop the fed­
eral government itself from providing the types of aid that 
Chakravarty proposes in his article, a reversal of the Ninth Circuit 
in the Humanitarian Law Project case could well have a chilling 
effect on the willingness of private humanitarian groups, especially 
those within the United States, to continue to pursue such activities. 
Indeed, the government’s view of the statute is so sweeping that it 
would even encompass the preparation of an amicus brief on behalf 
of an FTO.28 
Peter Margulies, too, offers a new way of thinking about issues 
with which we have already been grappling, framing the contempo­
rary debate over the future of detention policy as a combination of 
three factors: efficiency, equity, and accuracy.29  As Margulies puts 
it, these factors have as much to say about the differing positions 
over where to house current and future detainees as they have to 
say about the substantive merits of these cases and the scope of the 
government’s detention authority.  More than that, though, Margu­
lies’s thoughtful analysis draws on examples from everyday cases to 
show how, even in the unique context of detaining terrorism sus­
pects, we can gain insight from revisiting conventional “siting” con­
siderations that we take into account in transporting psychiatric 
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006). 
26. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 928-31 (9th Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted sub nom. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009). 
Chakravarty himself notes the overlap. See Chakravarty, supra note 23, at 314 n.60 R 
(discussing Humanitarian Law Project). 
27. Humanitarian Law Project, 552 F.3d at 928-30.  The court rejected a vague­
ness challenge to the statutory prohibition on providing “personnel” to FTOs, given 
that Congress in 2004 had expressly rewritten the statute to provide a more specific 
definition. Id. at 930-31. 
28. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 47–48, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Pro­
ject, No. 08-1498 (U.S. argued Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1498.pdf. 
29. See Peter Margulies, Putting Guantanamo in the Rear-View Mirror: The Politi­
cal Economy of Detention Policy, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 339 (2010). 
291 
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patients, locating wind farms, and other run-of-the-mill policy 
choices.30 
As importantly, Margulies reminds us that the detention issue 
is, first and foremost, a political problem.  Uncertainty still reigns 
paramount with regard to whether the Constitution provides non­
citizens held outside the United States (and not at Guantanamo) 
with a right to pursue habeas relief.31  And even in cases where 
such protection is available, the law has done very little to articulate 
the specific claims that the writ protects.32  With such a dearth of 
legal clarity, it may be a far more effective and realistic conversa­
tion to focus on the political factors behind the shaping of detainee 
policy, as opposed to our obsession with the legal rules that may or 
may not constrain the government’s choices.  And we need look no 
further for signs of this approach than to the Supreme Court’s 
March 2010 decision not to reach the merits of whether the federal 
courts have the power to release Uighurs, detained at Guantanamo, 
into the United States,33 instead remanding the case to the D.C. 
Circuit to consider the changed diplomatic (and political) 
circumstances.34 
One can find similar themes in the two student notes in this 
issue, as well.  Thus, Thomas Gray tackles the thorny but critical 
issues of contractor liability and immunity, a problem that grows 
only that much more important every year as more and more con­
ventional military functions are served by private contractors, 
even—if not especially—in foreign combat zones.35  Gray proposes 
as a solution the adoption of a standard along the lines of the test 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies 
30. See id. at 343-45. 
31. The question is currently raised in sharpest relief in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, the 
government’s appeal to the D.C. Circuit of Judge Bates’s ruling that noncitizens not 
initially detained in Afghanistan and not citizens of Afghanistan are protected by the 
Suspension Clause at Bagram Air Base. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 
214-26 (D.D.C. 2009). 
32. See, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 513-16 (D.C. Cir. 
2009), cert. denied, No. 09-581, 2010 WL 1005960 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010). 
33. See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam), 
vacating 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
34. Kiyemba I, 130 S. Ct. at 1235 (“[W]e vacate the judgment and remand the 
case to the [D.C.] Circuit.  It should determine, in the first instance, what further pro­
ceedings in that court or in the District Court are necessary and appropriate for the full 
and prompt disposition of the case in light of the new developments.”). 
35. See Thomas Gray, Note, I’m Just Following Orders: A Fair Standard of Immu­
nity for Military Service Contractors, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 373 (2010). 
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Corp.36  In his view, the law should shield contractors from liability 
when the injury in question resulted from an order, plan, or direc­
tive from the U.S. military; the contractor was not negligent; and 
the contractor disclosed to the United States any concerns or poten­
tial risks.37  Put somewhat differently, Gray’s note offers an argu­
ment to generalize a standard traditionally reserved for contractors 
in the products-liability context, in order to account for the unique 
national security concerns that arise when contractors are both lit­
erally and figuratively on the front lines. 
Although Gray is not the first to propose a thorough reconcep­
tualization of contractor liability, his discussion, like those offered 
by Chakravarty and Margulies, also dovetails with important on­
going litigation, especially in the Supreme Court.  Thus, the Court is 
currently waiting for the views of the Solicitor General as to 
whether it should grant certiorari in Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown 
& Root Services, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit decision mentioned 
above that relied upon the political-question doctrine to bar a zone-
of-combat tort claim against a government contractor.38  Moreover, 
although the Boyle test on which Gray proposes to rely has been 
heavily criticized in some circles,39 it should not be difficult to see 
how his multifactor balancing would allow for far more case-
specific consideration than the categorical bar to justiciability em­
braced by the court of appeals in Carmichael.  It would thereby risk 
far less distortion than a rule that effectively immunizes any and all 
claims arising out of contractor torts overseas. 
Last, although Sara Fawk’s note is perhaps the least obvious fit 
insofar as the distortion effect of national security considerations in 
contemporary jurisprudence, she deftly summarizes the 
hypertechnical—and yet quite significant—circuit split that has 
arisen over whether lawful permanent residents (LPRs) facing re­
moval for pre-1996 convictions may still seek relief under former 
section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act if the basis 
for their removal was not a basis for exclusion under the pre-1996 
36. 487 U.S. 500, 512-13 (1988). 
37. See Gray, supra note 35, at 375. R 
38. See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1280 
(11th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2009) (No. 09­
683). 
39. For criticisms of Boyle, see Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Gov­
ernment Contractor Defense: Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REV. 257 
(1991), and Michael D. Green & Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme Court and the Prod­
ucts Liability Crisis: Lessons from Boyle’s Government Contractor Defense, 63 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 637 (1990). 
293 
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framework.40  The issue arises because section 212(c) was itself 
styled as providing a “waiver of excludability,” giving rise to the 
possibility that such relief would not be available to individuals— 
such as LPRs—not subject to exclusion. 
At first blush, section 212(c) has little to do with national se­
curity concerns, especially given the other national-security related 
authorities for either removing noncitizens from the country or, at 
the very least, denying to terrorism suspects immigration remedies 
that might otherwise be available.41  But the circuit split at the heart 
of Fawk’s note is emblematic of the clear and well-documented 
anti-immigrant mentality that motivated the Antiterrorism and Ef­
fective Death Penalty Act of 199642 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Im­
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 199643 
(IIRIRA), the latter of which eliminated section 212(c) relief alto­
gether.  And much of that anti-immigrant mentality behind the 
1996 reforms was itself a response to fears of increased security 
threats posed by noncitizens, especially in light of the first World 
Trade Center bombing in 1993.44 
True, the Supreme Court saved at least some of section 212(c) 
in INS v. St. Cyr, holding that discretionary relief must still be avail­
able for individuals who pleaded guilty to the offenses that ren­
dered them removable prior to AEDPA and IIRIRA, lest the 
statutes have an impermissible retroactive effect.45  Nevertheless, 
the elimination in future cases of such an important case-specific 
means of blocking deportation at least in part because of the most 
amorphous of national security concerns provides perhaps the be­
ginning of our story, rather than the end.  And, given both the cir­
cuit split that Fawk identifies and an even more pronounced split 
over whether St. Cyr also applies when the defendant went to trial 
40. See Sara Fawk, Note, Eligibility for Section 212(c) Relief from Deportation: Is 
It the Ground or the Offense, the Dancer or the Dance?, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 417 
(2010); see also Sarah Koteen Barr, Comment, C is for Confusion: The Tortuous Path of 
Section 212(c) Relief in the Deportation Context, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 725 (2008) 
(also discussing the circuit split). 
41. See, e.g., Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534, 536–38 (7th Cir. 2008). 
42. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
43. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
44. Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651, 2010 WL 1222274, at *4–5 (U.S. Mar. 31, 
2010) (summarizing the increasing harshness of federal immigration law culminating 
with the 1996 revisions). See generally Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The 
REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the “Rule” of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
161, 162–63 & n.7 (2006–2007) (summarizing the background and implications of 
AEDPA and IIRIRA). 
45. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 325-26 (2001). 
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as opposed to pleading guilty,46 the odds are strong that section 
212(c) will be back before the Court before long.47 
* * * 
Justice Cardozo famously warned readers of “the tendency of a 
principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.”  That is the con­
cern here.  Although no one can deny that the government has a 
compelling interest in protecting us against future acts of terrorism, 
it is long-past the time to carefully reflect upon the extent to which 
this interest has affected (and will continue to influence) areas of 
previously settled doctrine.  We may end up deciding that the law is 
evolving in exactly the way that it should.  We may, instead, con­
clude that we’ve made mistakes, overzealously championing exten­
sions of precedent that, with the benefit of hindsight, we realize 
were neither necessary nor prudent.  I leave it to the individual 
readers to decide for themselves which is a fairer view of the cur­
rent state of affairs.  If nothing else, though, each of these four 
works of scholarship should help us better to appreciate the many 
ways in which this distinction matters. 
46. The logic is a bit hard to follow, but it is basically thus: St. Cyr concluded that 
noncitizens who faced criminal charges prior to 1996 might have pleaded guilty with the 
knowledge that they would still be eligible to apply for section 212(c) relief, relief that 
might not have been available had they been convicted at trial.  Thus, to apply the 
removal of section 212(c) relief to them would be “retroactive.”  In contrast, non­
citizens who went to trial anyway cannot be said to have made this calculation—that is, 
they did not decline to plead guilty strategically in order to preserve their eligibility for 
section 212(c) relief.  As such, to apply the statute to them would not have an impermis­
sible retroactive effect. See, e.g., Kellermann v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700, 705–07 (6th Cir. 
2010) (summarizing the issue and noting the large and sharp circuit split). 
47. But see Ferguson v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 563 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2009) (rais­
ing the same issue), cert. denied, 2010 WL 757697 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-263). 
